Dreaming argument & Pragmatism Dreaming

The Blumenfelds' argument in regards to dreaming is essentially that since we have dreams that resemble real life experiences, we cannot be certain that at this moment we are not dreaming, given that the character of our experience does not always alert us to the fact that we are in a dream state. Austen's objection to this is that simply being able to say that dreams have a 'real life' quality presumes that one knows what real life is, as distinguishable from dreams. Austen demands that there must be a particular reason to distrust one's senses and think that one is dreaming (Slides 15-16). "It is possible to recognize cases of deception only if there is a background of general non-deception" (Slide 17).

For a Pyrrhonian Skeptic, one must remain in a continual state of doubt. However, the Blumenfelds' argument suggests doubts in the ability for any contrast "the falliblist might claim that (3) is false because I can know that I am not dreaming even if the qualitative character of my experience only makes it highly probable that I am not dreaming" (Slide 23) .
G.E. Moore, of course, would find the Blumenfelds' intellectual exercise to be absurd, given that Moore believed that in the absence of evidence that there is no material world, we must operate with the assumption that the material world does exist -- just like we assume our hands exist when we grasp an object. It is the first premise of the Blumenfelds that is the most problematic, given that their other premises deductively follow from the first statement -- to state that dreams are 'like' reality presupposes that there is some existence that is reality, a reality that has more…